This paper studies the evolution and co-evolution of both characteristics of reciprocitythe willingness to reward friendly behavior and the willingness to punish hostile behavior. Firstly, both preferences for rewarding and preferences for punishing can survive in evolution provided individuals interact within separate groups. This holds even with randomly formed groups and even when individual preferences are unobservable, provided players adjust their play to the environment in their group. Secondly, preferences for rewarding survive only in coexistence with self-interested preferences, but preferences for punishing either vanish or dominate the population entirely. Thirdly, the evolution of preferences for rewarding and the evolution of preferences for punishing influence each other decisively. Rewarders can invade a population of self-interested players. The existence of rewarders enhances the evolutionary success of punishers, who then crowd out all other preference types. JEL-Classification: C72, D63, D64, D83
Introduction
This paper addresses three questions concerning the evolution and co-evolution of the two characteristics of reciprocity -the willingness to reward friendly behavior and the willingness to punish hostile behavior. 1) How can preferences for rewarding, and preferences for punishing, survive the evolutionary competition with purely self-interested preferences? 2) What structural differences distinguish the evolution of the willingness to reward from the evolution of the willingness to punish? 3) How is the evolution of one side of reciprocity influenced by the evolution of the other side?
Self-interested preferences are a standard assumption in economic theory. Yet, several experimental studies offer substantial evidence that at least some people are not exclusively driven by self-interest. A significant number of subjects are willing to reward friendly and/or to punish hostile behavior of an opponent even if this is costly and does not maximize their own material payoffs. 1 From an evolutionary standpoint this seems surprising since purely self-interested preferences induce a player to maximize his fitness, which seems optimal for survival. In this paper, we identify conditions under which preferences for rewarding friendly behavior and for punishing unfriendly behavior can survive the evolutionary process. We consider a model in which groups of a relative small size, also called "haystacks", are randomly formed from the infinite player population. 2 Players interact within these groups and adjust their behavior to the distribution of preferences within their group. We show that in such a model rewarders or punishers can survive the evolutionary competition with purely self-interested players. This holds even if individual preferences are unobservable, groups are formed randomly, and players interact anonymously in random pairings within their groups.
We find important structural differences between the evolution of preferences for rewarding and the evolution of preferences for punishing. Rewarders successfully invade a population of self-interested players, but they cannot drive them out completely. Rewarders survive only in coexistence with self-interested types. Punishers on the other hand either drive out other preferences and dominate the population, or they must disappear completely. The option to punish hostile behavior results either in a "culture of punishment" -where all players are willing to punish hostile behavior -or in a "culture of laissez faire" -where nobody is willing to incur the costs of punishing.
If the option to reward friendly behavior and the option to punish hostile actions are both available the evolution of rewarders and the evolution of punisher influence each other in a very interesting way. Rewarders can serve as a catalyst for the evolution of punishers. Rewarders invade a population of self-interested types. Their presence can then enable punishers to invade successfully, and finally to crowd out, both self-interested and rewarding types. Hence the option to reward friendly actions can crucially influence the equilibrium outcome even if in equilibrium nobody uses this option.
To see the gist of the argument consider pairwise interactions of the following structure: a first moving player, the proposer, may either cooperate or defect. 3 Cooperation is costly for the proposer but profitable for a second moving player, the responder. This responder observes the proposer's action and can then, at a personal cost, reward and/or punish the proposer or 1 For a survey of the experimental literature see Fehr and Gächter [10] or Fehr and Schmidt [11] . 2 The expression "Haystack Model" for settings where players interact only within randomly formed groups which are reshuffled after reproduction goes back to Maynard Smith's [28] example of mice living and replicating over the summer within separate haystacks. At harvest time when the haystacks are cleared mice scramble out into the meadow and mix up completely before colonizing new haystacks in the next summer. 3 We use the terms "cooperate" and "defect" to indicate an friendly or unfriendly act. The game differs from the prisoners' dilemma.
remain inactive. In Lemma 1 we show that in the role of the proposer it is indeed optimal to have self-interested preference which induce fitness maximizing behavior. This holds for the haystack model as well as for the model without group structure. It is the role of the responder in which the group structure changes the results of the evolutionary process.
In the model without group structure rewarding behavior can not survive evolution and cooperation disappears. While rewarders would be good for the overall population, they have to bear the fitness costs of rewarding whenever cooperation happens, while the fruits of the induced cooperation go equally to rewarders and self-interested players that do not reward. Thus, the proportion of rewarders must eventually fall below the level which is necessary to induce cooperation. There might still be a small fraction of responders with preferences to reward cooperation, but we see no rewarding since there is no cooperation that could be rewarded. In addition, if proposers tremble with any arbitrarily small probability and cooperate occasionally when it is not optimal then rewarders must at times bear the costs of rewarding and disappear completely. Without any group structure punishers have similar difficulties to survive the evolutionary process. When the proportion of punishers is sufficiently large there is an equilibrium in which proposers cooperate to avoid punishment and punishers do equally well as self-interested responders since in this equilibrium they do not have to punish. Yet, this equilibrium is not asymptotically stable. If a small shift towards a lower proportion of punishers occurs, then there is no evolutionary force bringing the state back. Once such small changes happen to lead to a state with such a small proportion of punishers that proposers switch to defection, costly punishments occur, and punishers die out. Note that the state without punishers (and no cooperation) is asymptotically stable and strong evolutionary forces reverse any small random shift in the population state. Furthermore, if proposers tremble with any arbitrarily small probability punishers perform always strictly worse than self-interested responders and evolution leads to a population without punishers and without cooperative behavior. 4 In the haystack model, in contrast, rewarders and punishers can survive and successfully induce cooperation. The key difference is that in the haystack model proposers adjust their behavior to the composition of the group they happen to play in. Within groups rewarders and punishers do still perform (weakly) worse than self-interested responders, but across groups this is no longer true. In fact, cooperation occurs in groups with a sufficiently high number of rewarders or punishers and everybody in such a group obtains higher fitness than players in uncooperative groups. Rewarders and punishers are more likely to play in these cooperative groups because cooperative groups are precisely those who happen to have a high number of rewarders or punishers. Thus rewarders and punishers are more likely to profit from being in a cooperative group. Put differently, responders have a marginal effect on the distribution of preferences in their group. Having reciprocal preferences leads to a fitness advantage for the responder when he is pivotal in his group, i.e. his type is decisive for whether the number of reciprocal preferences in his group is just above or just below the threshold for cooperation. This marginal effect is advantageous for a reciprocator and can outweigh the costs of rewarding or punishing.
The structural difference between the evolutionary dynamics for rewarders and the one for punishers is driven by the following. The hope for reward as well as the fear of punishment can induce proposers to cooperate. Yet, when most proposers cooperate it is relatively expensive for responders to reward cooperation whereas the willingness to punish is almost for free. On the other hand, when most proposers defect, the willingness to reward is almost for free, whereas it is expensive to punish defection. A higher fraction of rewarders or punishers leads to a higher fraction of groups in which cooperation occurs. Therefore, rewarders are relatively successful when most responders are self-interested, whereas punishers become more successful when more responders have preferences for rewarding or punishing.
In this paper we considerably relax the observability assumptions typically made in the related literature (compare Section 4). It is crucial for our results, however, that players adapt their behavior to the type composition of their group. In the main section we simply assume that players know the distribution of preferences in their respective groups and react optimally.
Would players really learn to do so if they have to learn only from past play? An important feature of this paper is that in Section 3 we consider several key robustness checks of our model, and in particular in Subsection 3.2 we show that we can replace the assumption of an observable group distribution by a simple process of learning by valuation. Our results require only that players learn to play 'as if' they would know the distribution of preferences in their group. We think of equilibrium play as the result of a fast operating learning process, fast compared to the evolution of preferences and fast compared to the frequency of group reshuffling. 5 The learning process does not necessarily need to be fully rational, but should eventually lead to beliefs close to the true distribution of play. Here, as usual in the literature using the indirect evolutionary approach, we assume that the game G is played recurrently, i.e. players act rationally according to their subjective preferences only in a myopic sense. We see the evolution of preferences as a short cut description for a situation where players use somewhat sophisticated, but not too complex heuristics to adapt their behavior. More specifically, in Subsection 3.2 we drop Assumption 2 and consider instead a simple process of learning by valuation. Subjective utilities serve to evaluate outcomes and players choose with high probability the action which lead to the highest average subjective payoff in the past. We show that players' behavior and payoffs are arbitrarily close to the equilibrium play derived under Assumption 2. On the other hand we consider the evolution of preferences to be a very slow process, relative to the fast learning process and relative to the reshuffling of groups. 6 In Subsection 3.3 we show that for a sufficiently slow speed of the evolution of preferences within-group evolutionary effects are small and do not significantly change our results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and analyzes three naturally arising settings: 1) Player 2 might have only the costly option of rewarding cooperation. 2) Player 2 might have only the costly option of punishing defection. 3) Player 2 might have both the options -rewarding cooperation and punishing defection. Section 3 discusses the robustness of our results with respect to small trembles, replacing the assumption of an observable group composition by a learning process, and with respect to within-group evolutionary effects. Section 4 discusses the related literature. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
We describe the evolution of preferences by adopting the indirect evolutionary approach, pioneered by Güth and Yaari [16] . A game G is played recurrently. Players can differ in their (subjective) preferences over the outcomes of G. Preferences determine players' behavior, behavior in turn determines the (objective) material payoffs, or fitness. Fitness regulates the evolutionary success, i.e. the future occurrence of each preference type.
Let G be a two-player extensive form game of perfect information structure. Both players move exactly once. The first moving player 1, the proposer, can either cooperate (C) or defect (D). We use these terms to indicate that cooperation enhances the fitness of the second moving player 2, the responder, but requires the proposer to incur some fitness costs. This feature is analog to the (sequential) prisoners dilemma, yet the responder's options differ. Depending on the setting he can reward, punish or abstain from doing so after observing the proposer's move (see below). Let X denote the set of decision nodes and O the set of terminal nodes. We call a terminal node o ∈ O an outcome of the game G. The material payoff function π : O → IR 2 represents the fitness players obtain after a certain path of play.
Players may not maximize their material payoff and can differ in their subjective preferences.
We describe preferences by (subjective) von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities over outcomes of G. These utilities can depend on the role a player has in the game. Thus each player assigns to each outcome of the game two subjective utilities, one is his utility if he happens to play in the role of the proposer and the second, potentially different, utility is relevant if he is in the role of the responder. Let there be an infinite population of players. 7 6 Players could for instance have fixed preferences during their entire live and with high probability pass on their preferences to their offsprings. To avoid the intricacies of sexual reproduction we can e.g. consider a cultural process in which daughters learn to evaluate outcomes from their mother and sons learn their values from their father. Such a very slow evolutionary process might even suggest that our preferences for reciprocity were mostly formed by the conditions of a hunter-gatherer societies which lived in relatively small bands. This is consistent with our haystack model. Reshuffling of groups might perhaps occur a few times during a player's lifetime, and learning to adjust behavior to a new group could be a matter of weeks. 7 All results can be derived equally in a model of two infinite populations, one proposer population and one of all preference types. We restrict our analysis to finite sets of preference types and we assume that each preference type in each role has strict preferences over outcomes. Let the simplex Γ denote the set of all probability distributions over Θ and γ ∈ Γ represents a population state.
Then γ θ represents the proportion of type θ ∈ Θ in the total population. Furthermore, we assume that
are irrational numbers, which is generically true. 8 A random process recurrently matches individuals to play G. We will contrast the most common setting in the literature of a single infinite population without any group structure in which players, randomly drawn from the entire population, are matched to play G, with our haystack model, in which matching takes place only within randomly drawn groups of finite size.
Each of the infinitely many groups has 2N members, N players are randomly drawn from the total population to play in position 1 and N players are randomly drawn from the population to play in position 2. Once in a group players keep their role until the group is resolved. 9
For a specific group let k θ i be the number of players of type θ i ∈ Θ i in player position i. Thus
is a vector representing the entire preference type composition of a group.
Assumption 1 Distribution of Groups in the Haystack Model Each group member in
each player position i ∈ {1, 2} is drawn independently from the infinite player population with the probability of drawing type θ i ∈ Θ i equal to the proportion γ θ i of that type in the population.
Thus the probability that a group has composition k if the population state is γ is given by
Players act optimally according to their preferences and according to their beliefs about the opponent's play. Furthermore, players have correct beliefs about the distribution of actions they will face. Thus they play perfect Bayesian equilibria of the corresponding two player game of incomplete information Γ.
In the standard model without subgroups a player in position i beliefs to face type θ j with probability γ θ j . In our haystack model we assume also that individual preferences are unobservable, relaxing the observability assumption typically made in order to explain the survival of social preferences. Yet, we do want to capture that players adapt to their local environment, responder population.
and eventually act optimally given the composition of their group.
Assumption 2 In the haystack model players' beliefs about the opponent's play corresponds to
the true distribution of actions in their group.
In Subsection 3.2 we drop Assumption 2 and consider instead a simple process of learning by valuation. Subjective utilities serve to evaluate outcomes and players choose with high probability the action which lead to the highest average subjective payoff in the past. We show that players' behavior and payoffs are arbitrarily close to the equilibrium play derived under Assumption 2.
Groups stay together for a finite number T of periods. In each period players are matched randomly with an opponent within their group and play the game G anonymously. The T periods add up to a duration of T, a time period assumed to be brief relative to the speed of the evolution of preferences. In particular, while a group stays together, the composition of preferences in the group does not change. Yet, we think of T as a long time period relative to the speed of learning to play optimal for a given preference distribution in a given group. This is only relevant when we drop Assumption 2 in Subsection 3. For any given population state γ ∈ Γ and a given matching scenario we derive the equilibrium play and calculate the average fitness of a player with preference type θ, denoted π θ (γ).
We follow a standard approach in evolutionary game theory and describe the evolutionary dynamics by a system of differential equations. 10 A growth rate function g assigns to each population state γ and preference type θ the growth rate g θ (γ) of the associated population share γ θ . The evolution of preferences is described by the system of differential equationṡ Regularity ensures that the dynamics is well defined. Payoff monotonicity means that the proportion of a type with higher average fitness increases relative to types with lower fitness.
This captures the process of evolutionary selection. The formal definitions are in the appendix.
Preferences in player-position 1
What preference types are relevant for our analysis? We are mainly interested in the evolution of preferences for the position of player 2 -reciprocal behavior is only possible in that position.
However, the evolutionary success of preferences for player position 2 depends on the behavior of players in position 1. The following shows that we should expect fitness maximizing behavior of players in position 1. All proofs are in the Appendix. Lemma 1 refers to our haystack model. Analog statements are true in the model of a single infinite population without group structure. The argument in the setting without group structure is completely analogous to the proof of Lemma 1.
In terms of fitness it is therefore always optimal for proposers to have preferences which simply maximize their own expected fitness. Lemma 1 thus strongly suggests that it is sufficient to consider fitness maximizing proposers, which simplifies our further analysis significantly. 11 In this sense Assumption 4 is rather a shortcut than an assumption which allows us to focus on the evolution of preferences for the responder position.
Assumption 4 All proposers maximize their expected fitness.
Setting 1: Costly Rewarding
Setting 1 concentrates on the possibility that player 2 can reward cooperation of player 1. 12
The game G is given by Figure 2 . It is also known as the 'trust game'. The fitness payoffs are known to maximize their fitness, the Pareto dominated outcome is played in the subgame perfect equilibrium. Self-interested responders will not reward because doing so is costly, c r > 0.
Anticipating such a reaction, proposers defect as
In the evolutionary model we need to distinguish only between two classes of responder types. Rewarders have a subjective utilities θ 2 (o R ) > θ 2 (o C ) and therefore reward cooperation.
In contrast, self-interested responders have preferences with θ 2 (o R ) < θ 2 (o C ) and do not reward cooperation.
In the standard model without any group structure the result of the evolutionary process is essentially the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game with fitness payoffs. The fitness 11 One caveat may be in place. Some equilibria that are asymptotically stable under Assumption 4 may be only Lyaponov stable when allowing for more preference types in position 1.
12 We could give player 2 an additional option to reward player 1 also after defection. It is straightforward to show that preferences for rewarding defection cannot be part of any stable equilibrium. Hence, we abstract from this possibility. So our evolutionary argument works only for rewarding conditional on cooperative behavior by the first player. Unconditional rewards (i.e. unconditional altruism) can not survive in our setting of non-assortatively formed groups.
maximizing proposers cooperate only if they believe that the probability of being rewarded is sufficiently high, i.e. if γ + ≥ d 1 −c 1 r , where γ + denotes the proportion of rewarders. Then rewarders obtain fitness of c 2 −c r , strictly less than the payoff c 2 that all self-interested responders obtain. In the payoff monotonic evolutionary dynamics the proportion of rewarders decreases until the proportion γ + of rewarders is so small that proposers stop cooperating and both types earn the same payoff d 2 . Only population states in which no positive mass of proposers cooperates can be Lyapunov stable. Furthermore, self-interested responders do strictly better than rewarders if proposers tremble occasionally. Then only γ + = 0 is stable. In our haystack model the proportion of rewarders varies across groups. The probability of a group with k + rewarders if the overall proportion of rewarders is γ + reduces to a Binomial 
In every group self-interested players earn (weakly) greater payoffs than rewarders. Yet rewarders are slightly more likely to be in a group where proposers cooperate. If exactly k * of the other (N − 1) responders are rewarders, a rewarder ends up in a group of cooperation, whereas a self-interested player 2 is in a defective group. The average fitness difference between rewarders and self-interested responders across all groups is given byπ
Proposition 1 (Coexistence in the unique mixed equilibrium)
N . Then there exists a unique stable equilibrium in which rewarders and self-interested responders coexist. 13 
Remark 1 If
N then a monomorphic responder population of rewarders forms the unique stable equilibrium.
For an intuitive understanding consider first a population consisting almost entirely of selfinterested players. Then the vast majority of groups contain few rewarders and thus proposers defect. In these groups rewarders and self-interested responders obtain the same low payoff d 2 .
Yet, in a small number of groups the number of rewarders is above the threshold k * + and proposers cooperate. Every responder in these cooperative groups earns higher fitness than responders in groups without cooperation. The share of rewarders in these successful groups is at least k * + +1 N and hence far above the share of rewarders in the total population (which is close to zero). Rewarders profit relatively more from these successful groups and can successfully invade a self-interested population. A small proportion of self-interested responders can also invade a population of rewarders. In most groups the number of rewarders is then above the threshold k * + and proposers cooperate. Rewarders gain a fitness of only (c 2 −c r ) in these groups, whereas a selfinterested responders avoid the costs of rewarding and earns the higher payoff of c 2 . The share of self-interested responders will grow. Only in the case that k * + = N − 1 self-interested responders cannot invade a population of rewarders. Even if only one self-interested responder invades a group he destroys the cooperative behavior of proposers and free-riding becomes impossible.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that in the haystack model some players cooperate and some responders reward this cooperation in the unique stable equilibrium. The group structure of the haystack model together with the option to reward cooperation results in a Pareto improvement in terms of expected fitness compared to the traditional model without subgroups. Yet, for k * + < N − 1 also non-rewarding self-interested responders survive and defection will occur in some groups. The outcome is still inefficient.
The comparative statics of γ eq + , the equilibrium proportion of rewarders, follows in case of a mixed equilibrium directly from the conditionπ + (γ
The right-hand side is strictly increasing in γ + by Assumption 1. For larger values of
eq + needs to be larger, too. So γ eq + is strictly increasing in (c 2 − d 2 ), the gains of cooperation for the responder, and strictly decreasing in c r , the cost of rewarding. Intuitively, higher costs of rewarding reduce the fitness of rewarders, and higher gains from cooperation for the responder increase the gain from inducing it. In addition, if
goes to one, then γ eq + goes to zero and if
goes to infinity, then γ eq + goes to one. This implies that the equilibrium proportion can be anywhere between zero and one, if we select the right parameters. Furthermore, the right-hand side is decreasing in k * + , which represents N 2
, the cost of cooperation for the proposer and weakly decreasing in the reward r. The larger k * + the more rewarders are necessary to establish cooperation. The number of self-interested responders who can free-ride without putting cooperation into danger decreases. Finally we show in the appendix that γ eq + is strictly decreasing in the group size N , if
is only close to being proportional to N .
Intuitively, larger groups reduce the probability of being pivotal. Hence, larger groups lead to a lower level of cooperation.
Setting 2: Costly Punishment
In Setting 2 responders have only the option to punish hostile behavior (i.e. defection) of the proposer. 14 This punishment is costly. The interaction is given by Figure 3 . In the evolutionary models we distinguish between punishers with subjective utilities
. Proposers maximize their expected fitness and cooperate only if the probability of being punished for defection is sufficiently high.
In the standard evolutionary model without any group structure the only asymptotically stable state is defection, the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game with fitness payoffs. The p . In these groups both types of responders earn the same highest fitness of c 2 . In groups below this threshold, proposers defect and the fitness of all responders is lower. Self-interested responders earn the fitness d 2 while punishers get the even lower fitness of
. Then proposers cooperate in groups with
For a given population state γ − the difference in the average fitness between a punisher and self-interested responder is
Proposition 2 Let
The only asymptotically stable states are the two monomorphic populations γ − = 0 and γ − = 1. The unique mixed equilibrium is not stable. 15 
Remark 2 If
d 1 −c 1 p < 1 N then k * − = 0
and a single punisher in a group induces cooperation. Then only a monomorphic punisher population can be stable.
In contrast to Setting 1, the option to punish defection drives the population to a monomorphic state. Either a "culture of punishment" develops where all responders are willing to punish, or a "culture of laissez faire" where no responder punishes defectors.
Consider first a population dominated by self-interested responders. A punisher is then typically the only punisher in his group and is unable to enforce cooperation by the proposers.
Proposers defect. The punisher incurs the fitness cost of punishing and obtains the minimal fitness (d 2 − c p ) while the self-interested responders earn the higher fitness d 2 . Punishers cannot invade a self-interested responder population. Consider now a responder population dominated by punishers. Most groups have enough punishers to induce cooperation by the proposers. Yet then even punishers do not have to execute the punishment and in these groups all responder types earn the maximal fitness of c 2 . Only a few groups are below the threshold k * − and in these groups punishers earn lower fitness. Yet, if the overall proportion of punishers γ − is high enough then there is more weight on groups in which a punisher is pivotal to induce cooperation then on groups in which he actually has to punish. Self-interested responders cannot invade a population of punishers. The key difference between Setting 1 and Setting 2 is that rewaders incur costs only if they are successful in inducing cooperation while punisher incur costs only if they fail to induce cooperation. The option to punish may be good or bad for total welfare (measured 15 Again, we could generalize this result slightly. Take any trait such that (a) when the fraction of a group possessing the trait is above s * (with
) then all agents do equally well; (b) when the fraction is less then s * then all agents in the group do worse, but those without the trait do better; (c) agents are randomly assigned to groups. Then the two monomorphic equilibria in which either all players do have the trait or all players do not have the trait are stable.
by the sum of the proposer's and the responder's fitness). In the punisher equilibrium we get full cooperation. Yet, the cooperative outcome maximizes welfare only if
reduces welfare otherwise. The option to reward cooperation in Setting 1, in contrast, always increases welfare but will typically not maximize it since some defection occurs in equilibrium.
The unstable mixed equilibrium γ cut − separates the basins of attraction of both stable equilibria and is characterized byπ − (γ cut ) =π s (γ cut ). The comparative statics of γ cut − is similar to the comparative statics of γ eq + in the previous subsection and can be found in the working paper version. In Setting 2 we found two stable equilibria and may end up in an equilibrium of punishers or in an equilibrium of self-interested responders. Setting 3 allows for rewarders and punishers. We then find that, under the right conditions, only a monomorphic responder population of punishers forms a stable equilibrium.
Setting 3: Costly Rewarding or Costly Punishment
In Setting 3 the responder has both options: costly punishing after defection and costly rewarding after cooperation. This allows us to analyze how the evolution of one side of reciprocity influences the evolution of the other side. The interaction is illustrated in Figure 4 . All pro- 
posers maximize their expected material payoffs. All possible preferences of responders fall into one of four categories: Self-interested players neither reward cooperation nor punish defection.
Punishers do not reward cooperation, but do punish defection. Rewarders reward cooperation, but do not punish defection. Reciprocal players both reward cooperation and punish defection. 16 Thus we need to distinguish only these four responder types. In fact, it turns out that only the first three types are really important for the dynamics, since typically either rewarding or punishing is the cheaper way to induce cooperation. Accordingly the reciprocal type who rewards and punishes is outperformed either by rewarders or by punishers.
Now the only monomorphic population that is stable is a population consisting entirely of punishers. A monomorphic population of self-interested players is destabilized by rewarders, a monomorphic rewarder population is destabilized by punishers (and also by self-interested players), and a monomorphic population of reciprocal players is not stable against punishers.
Proposition 3 In Setting 3 under Assumptions 1-4 a monomorphic punisher population is always a stable equilibrium. The remaining monomorphic states are unstable.
Are there other stable equilibria consisting of several preference types? The answer depends on the parameters of the model. For the right range of parameters this is the only stable equilibrium and the population converges to a pure punisher population from any initial interior state. Rewarders as well as punisher can induce cooperation by the proposers. We know from the analysis of Setting 2 that punisher become more successful when their own fraction is growing.
Hence, punishers also profit from a growing proportion of rewarders. Any kind of reciprocity helps to induce cooperation of proposers and reduces the costs of being a punisher. Thus, higher fractions of rewarders and higher fractions punishers enhance the evolutionary success of preferences for punishing. Conversely, we know from Setting 1 that the evolutionary success of rewarders relative to self-interested players decreases if their own proportion becomes too large. Hence, the same holds for too large a fraction of punishers. Furthermore, relative to preferences for punishing, the success of preferences for rewarding is reduced by an increase of the proportion of any type of reciprocity. The higher the fraction of rewarders or punishers, the more groups are above the threshold for cooperation. Thus, costs of rewarding grow, whereas the costs of punishing fall. Higher fractions of rewarders and higher fractions of punishers reduce the evolutionary success of preferences for rewarding relative to the success of preferences for punishing.
This interdependence between the evolution of both types of reciprocity has interesting consequences. Consider an entirely self-interested population. Preferences for punishing cannot invade such a population directly, as shown in Setting 2. Yet preferences for rewarding can invade (see Setting 1). They can serve as a "catalyst" and enable the invasion of punishers.
The more punishers invade, the more successful they become, and eventually they drive out self-interested players as well as rewarders.
In fact, we obtain the very strong results of convergence to the pure punisher equilibrium from any interior state whenever the costs of punishing and rewarding are not too high and under an additional technical requirement. We provide the formal statement of this condition in the appendix together with the proof of the next proposition. This condition excludes parameter constellations in which e.g. a punisher cannot successfully enter a population consisting only of reciprocal and self-interested players merely because a single punisher never induces cooperation in such groups. Here is an example of an assumption that is sufficient (but certainly not necessary) to ensure that Condition 1 holds.
Assumption 5
The proposers' material loss p after being punished equals his material gain r after being rewarded, i.e. p = r, and
This assumption simplifies the analysis and allows to characterize for which paramter values we (determined by the equationπ − (γ cut ) =π s (γ cut )) at which punishers become more successful than self-interested players. Once preferences for punishing can invade, they drive out all other preferences and the dynamics leads to a monomorphic punisher population. 
Robustness Checks
In this section we consider several robustness checks of our results. In Subsection 3.1 we consider the robustness with respect to small mistakes in players' choices. In Subsection 3.2 we consider what happens when we drop the assumption that players observe the distribution of preferences in their group and players have to use a simple learning heuristic to adapt their behavior to the composition of their group. In Subsection 3.3 we check robustness of our results when allowing for some evolution of preferences within groups.
All three robustness checks can be seen as a perturbation of our main model. We show that our results change only slightly. The results we obtain with this perturbed processes have a similar structure and the definition below is useful for all three robustness checks. For each setting we consider "perturbed" models with the same type space, players are still interacting randomly and anonymously in groups with N proposers and N responders. Also the interaction remains the same with the same fitness payoffs. We consider situations where players play optimally only in most periods and only in most groups. This helps to check robustness of our results when players occasionally fail to play optimally, either because players tremble occasionally, or because players have to learn to play optimally in their respective group. We do also allow that a small number of groups may change their type composition in subperiods between the reshuffling of groups and the probability distribution changes correspondingly. This is useful for the analysis of within-group evolutionary effects. Let P t θ,k (γ) denote the probability in subperiod t that a player of type θ is in a group that has the constant composition k in all T subperiods. Similarly, let B θ,k (γ) denote the probability that a player of type θ ends up in a group of composition k where the distribution over groups is Multinomial as in Assumption 1. 17 Fix a setting and the corresponding stage game G. For each group with N players in either positions and of composition k let a t k denote the vector of actions that each member in this group takes at time t given the perturbed process. Let a * k denote the vector of actions played in each subperiod in the main model in Section 2 (including Assumption 2). Without loss of generality we assume that all such vectors are sorted in the same sequence of types. Let W t k be the probability distribution over action-profiles in subperiod t which is generated by the perturbed process given a group which has the constant type composition k in all T subperiods. 
Our haystack model turns out to be robust to perturbations that are bounded by a suf- Note that on the one hand for sufficiently small δ > 0 all stable equilibria derived in the previous sections are δ-stable. 18 On the other hand, for any given δ > 0 the newly arising stable
states of the perturbed model will not remain δ-stable if the perturbation becomes sufficiently small. 
Small perturbations of play
In this section we consider the robustness of our results when players make occasional mistakes.
We assume that players in both positions may, with a small probability, fail to play optimally and deviate from maximizing their expected subjective utility. A simple example of such a process is one in which every player plays optimally, with probability of at least (1 − ), given the other players' behavior, but trembles with a small probability bounded by . We allow the probability ε i (k) of these mistakes to depend on the player's position i ∈ {1, 2}, his type θ, the number of periods t he played in the group already, and the composition k of the respective group he is in. We only require that all this mistakes are bounded by , i.e. ε t iθ (k) < for all i ∈ {1, 2}, θ ∈ Θ, t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, and k.
One issue that arises is whether small probability trembles of players in one position do change the optimal response of the players in the other position -then behavior in a group might change significantly even in instances where no tremble occurs. Trembles by proposers cannot have this effect since responders do observe the proposers action, know at which decision node they are, and choose their optimal action correspondingly. In particular, in instances where the proposer did not tremble, responders' optimal choices match exactly their behavior from the corresponding setting without trembles. The effect of trembles by responders could however have the effect that optimal behavior of the proposers changes in groups that are close to the threshold. Yet it turns out that for sufficiently small trembles this cannot happen and the optimal response for proposers remains unaffected by the trembling of the responders. Proposition 5 together with Lemma 2 confirms that our results are robust to mistakes that proposers and responders commit with small probability. There are δ-stable sets in this perturbed dynamics and if the state is in one of these sets then the state is arbitrarily close to one of the stable equilibria derived in Section 2 without mistakes. Note also, that in Setting 1 and Setting 3 a purely self-interested population forms also a stable equilibrium, but it is not δ-stable for sufficiently small perturbations.
Learning the distribution of preferences in a group
In this subsection we consider the robustness of our results with respect to dropping Assumption 2. What happens if players, and in particular responders, do not simply know the distribution of preferences in their group but have to learn how to play optimally in their group?
We envision this learning process to operate fast within a given group, while the evolution of preferences is a very slow process. After a group is randomly formed players' preferences remain constant until the group is reshuffled after a period of time T. Given their subjective preferences, players' behavior adjusts fast to optimal behavior and an equilibrium emerges. This equilibrium is played for a while before the group dissolves. We divide this time period T into T subperiods of length T T . In each subperiod the basic game is played once. We are interested in the limit when T becomes large. Then there is enough time for players to learn to play an equilibrium in the early periods and to play this equilibrium afterwards for most of the time period T. For a given distribution of preferences in a group we consider a simple learning by valuation process, adapted from Jehiel-Samet [22] to our setting.
Each player keeps track of the average subjective utility he obtained whenever he played a certain action available to him at a certain information set. At any information set a player chooses with probability (1 − ) the action which earned him the highest average utility in the past. If both actions did equally well he chooses each action with probability 1 2 . The other action which resulted in a lower average utility in the past is played with a small probability > 0. We interpret this as trembling or as occasional mistakes. Players cannot avoid to make these mistakes, yet they can learn from them. A different interpretation is to consider this as a primitive form of experimentation. To start the process we assume that each player at any information set plays each action at least once before he repeats an action available at that information set. Lemma 3, together with Proposition 5, shows that replacing Assumption 2 by a process of learning by valuation does change our results only slightly, provided players play in sufficiently many subperiods before reshuffling occurs. Then, only a small proportion of the time period T is needed for learning, after which players act almost "as if" they knew the distribution of preferences in their group.
Within group evolution
In this section we analyze the robustness of our results with respect to the effect of within-group evolution. So far we assumed that the evolution of preferences only takes place when the groups are reshuffled, and thus the distribution of preferences in each group remained always completely random. This is a good approximation when the speed of the evolution of preferences is slow relative to the frequency of group reshuffling, a point we make precise in this section. One way to think of the assumption that the evolution of preferences occurs only during reshuffling is that players produce offspring in every period which are first in a separate pool, of not yet reproducing potential future players. After T periods before groups are reshuffled a (small) fraction f of the players dies and is replaced randomly by players from the pool of offspring.
From this new population new random groups are formed. Then the group composition is always multinomially distributed.
What happens now if we assume instead that evolution can take place in every subperiod.
We want to allow for some within-group evolution, while preserving the effect that groups with higher average fitness have more offsprings. A natural way to capture this would be to allow the cooperative groups to grow in size relative to the non-cooperative groups. However, given this is a robustness check of our previous model, we want to keep the group size constant at 2N interacting players. We therefore allow groups with higher average fitness in their group to have more offsprings, but these offsprings remain inactive until they either replace an active player or until the next reshuffling of groups occurs.
For any of the three models considered so far, the main model of Section 2, the model with trembles in Subsection 3.1, and the model with learning by valuation in Subsection 3.2, we consider the following extension which allows for within-group evolutionary forces. In any given subperiod every player passes away with probability w > 0, independent across players and subperiods, and is replaced by one of the offspring. Then the expected number of subperiods a player lives is given by 1 w . Thus smaller w correspond to large expected times before a player dies and is replaced. We consider situations where the total population does not grow or shrink.
This implies that with a lower probability of dying, the overall number of offspring must be smaller, which corresponds to a rescaling of the fitness payoffs by a common factor. Then a small w corresponds to a slow speed of evolution. The precise way how replacement occurs turns out to be irrelevant for our robustness check. For concreteness, assume that dead players are replaced with offspring from the same group, if there are any, and with random players from the remaining groups otherwise.
In addition, we assume that for any type θ the proportion this type has in the offspring population in the next period is bounded by Cγ θ , where C > 0 is a potentially large, but finite, constant and γ θ the proportion of type θ players in the original total population. This assumption is very natural, in particular if we think of situations, where every player reproduces at some rate that is independent from the interaction we investigate plus a growth rate that is derived from the performance in the interaction that we consider.
The key observation for our next result is that if evolution is sufficiently slow relative to the frequency of group reshuffling, than only an arbitrarily small proportion of groups will change their composition and we have a ∆-bounded perturbation of the main model. Thus, as long as the evolution of preferences is slow compared to the frequency of group reshuffling, Lemma 4 together with Proposition 5 shows that in group evolutionary effects are minor and do not fundamentally change our results.
Related Literature
The existing evolutionary literature has paid little attention to the structural differences between the evolution of a willingness to reward and a willingness to punish and their mutual interaction and how they can complement each other in undermining the prevalence of purely self-interested preferences and establish cooperation. The question about how reciprocity or social preferences can survive evolution in sporadic interactions has however been tackled by several authors from biology, psychology, economics and other social sciences.For detailed surveys of the literature on reciprocity see Sobel [40] or Sethi and Somanathan [39] . 20 A first branch of literature deviates from random encounters and assumes assortative matching, i.e. players are more likely to play with players of their own type. Then being a cooperative type has the advantage of being more likely to face cooperative players which is an evolutionary advantage. Most of the literature on group selection focuses on this idea to explain the evolutionary survival of social preferences. Price [31] first offered a mathematical description. 20 Our discussion focuses on sporadic interactions among genetically unrelated individuals. For related individuals kin selection would be crucial. For infinitely repeated interactions purely self-interested individuals can establish cooperation. Guttman [17] points out that already in finitely repeated interactions cooperation is easier to achieve and costs of reciprocal preferences become be very small and a small degree of observability is sufficient to achieve cooperation. There are other interesting evolutionary models which are less directly related to our approach. Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked [9] find that altruists, who live on a circle, can survive in a local imitation process. Huck and Oechssler [21] look at ultimatum games in which costs of punishing unfair behavior are very small compared to the punishment and the inverse group-size. In a finite group punishers, when in the role of the proposer, have a small relative advantage over materialists in their group since they are slightly less likely to be matched with a punisher. This can be sufficient to compensate punishers for the costs of punishing if these costs are very small. There are also models in which, quite different from our approach, players' fitness depends directly on a payoff of the group. In Weibull and Salomonson [43] the groups average payoff can directly enter a players fitness in a positive or negative way, which leads respectively to altruism or spitefulness towards group members. In Kuzmics and Rodriguez-Sickert [26] groups occasionally fight each other and a copy of the winning group replaces the losing group. On the somewhat separate issue of whether evolution selects the Pareto efficient equilibrium in coordination games see Robson [32] , Kandori-Mailath-Rob [23] , Robson-Vega-Redondo [33] , and Kuzmics [25] .
Bergstrom [2] investigates the relation between assortative matching and the evolution of cooperation. Notice that initially random groups may become assortative over time by the evolution of preferences inside groups if no reshuffling of groups occurs (compare e.g. Cooper and Wallace [6] ). 21 Bergstrom [3] and Sober and Wilson [41] survey this branch of the literature.
A second branch of this literature assumes that preferences are observable. This can give social preferences an advantage over self-interested preferences due to a commitment effect. A reciprocal player, for instance, is credibly committed to rewarding friendly or punishing unfriendly behavior. Therefore, he may induce friendly behavior of a first-moving player, thus enhancing his evolutionary success. The results of Güth and Yaari [16] , Güth [15] , Bester and Güth [4] , and partly Sethi [37] are based on this argument. These results depend crucially on the assumption of observable preferences and on the set of allowed preferences, as Dekel et al. [7] , Ely and Yilankaya [8] , and Ok and Vega-Redondo [30] point out. They show for symmetric, normal-form games that evolution favors self-interested preferences, or at least leads to equilibrium play 'as if' players were purely self-interested, provided preferences are unobservable, and provided players are randomly matched within one single, infinite population.
A third branch of related literature considers models with types who exhibit behavior called "parochialism". Players interact in symmetric public good games in which, for any given strategy profile of the opponents, it is individually optimal to not contribute, but it would be optimal for all players if everybody would contribute. The number of players in the public good game may be two, in which case the game is the prisoners' dilemma and preferences are assumed to be observable. The number of players can also be larger in which case it is enough to assume that each player knows the distribution of preferences in his group, somewhat similar to Assumption 2 which we make in Section 2 and which we later replace by an explicit learning process in Subsection 3.2. These "parochial" types act to enhance efficiency if they play the public good game with mainly their own type and act to reduce efficiency if they play mainly with self-interested players. They may survive evolution even if the matching is non-assortative. Sethi and Somanathan [38] show in such a setting that conditional altruists who behave in a friendly way towards other altruists but spitefully towards materialists may be more successful than pure materialists. Similarly, and somewhat related to our setting 2, Gintis [14] looks at the evolution of strong reciprocity. The model considers conditional punishers who are willing to punish only if there are enough punishers in their group to induce cooperation and thus there is no need to ever actually carry out the punishments. But if conditional punishers happen to be in such a group where they would be willing to punish, they have to bear some surveillance costs. This additional assumption avoids that conditional punishers do always better than self-interested players. Conditional punishers can survive the evolutionary process in this model, as they can in our model, but the evolutionary dynamics is very different. In Gintis' model conditional punishers can successfully invade a population of self-interested players since punishment never really have to be carried out and surveillance costs are assumed to accrue only in groups where cooperation is induced. The dynamic in our model is almost the opposite. When there are few punishers in the total population, punishers perform poorly compared to self-interested players since there is little cooperation and they have to punish a lot. When there are many punishers in the total population punishers perform better than self-interested players since there is a lot of cooperation and few punishments are necessary. 22 Höffler [19] provides a model which is related to our Setting 1. He considers bounded-rational workers who work in payoff-maximizing firms. Firms can either enforce a certain effort by keeping workers under surveillance or they can save the surveillance costs, pass on some part of the saved costs in form of a higher wage instead, and hope that workers do not cheat. Without surveillance workers can shirk or play fair and they adapt their strategy according to a proportional imitation rule. The results are similar to our findings in Setting 1 in the sense that if most workers cheat, playing fair gives on average across firms higher payoffs, while if most workers play fair, cheating is on average the more successful strategy. In equilibrium some workers play fair, others don't. Our model differs substantially from Höffler's. First, we are really interested in comparing the evolution of rewarders and punishers and in understanding how they influence each other. Second, even if we focus on our Setting 1 where we have only rewarders, we have a quite different model. In Höffler, firms are payoff maximizing by assumption and only workers' strategies evolve. We start with a setting were players in both positions can have any strict preferences over outcomes and derive in Lemma 1 that payoff maximizing behavior will prevail. Thus the asymmetry between proposers (who always maximize their fitness) and responders (who can have reciprocal preferences) arises endogenously. Furthermore, we conduct a number of robustness checks. In particular, we show that our results are robust to dropping the assumption of an observable distribution of preferences and replacing it by a simple learning process.
Discussion and Conclusion
Lemma 3 together with Proposition 5 shows that replacing the Assumption of an observable group composition by a simple reinforcement-learning process by valuation changes our results only slightly and in this sense Assumption 2 can be seen as a shortcut for a fast learning process in which players with given preferences adopt fast to the strategic environment of their respective group environment. In addition, Lemma 4 shows that the key results survive in-group evolutionary effects when these are small which is true when the evolution of preferences is a slow process compared to the frequency of reshuffling.
Learning by valuation requires some sophistication but falls short of full rationality. Can we 22 Bowles and Gintis [5] and Friedman and Singh [13] consider also the case when individual preferences are unobservable for the evolution of types who punish non-cooperative behavior. Friedman and Singh implicitly need the assumption that second-order punishment (i.e. the punishment of non-punishers) is costless. Bowles and Gintis consider a model where punishment takes the form of ostracism. Their model is too complex for an analytical solution but in simulations they also find that punishers can survive. 23 When we allow again for in-group evolution, our results remain valid if the speed of the evolution of preferences is sufficiently slow compared to the frequency of reshuffling 1 T , while T is large enough to give incentives to experiment and learn to adapt the the group players are in.
So far all robustness checks did not change the results significantly. Dropping Assumption 2 may however change results significantly in a setting in which all players, and in particular the responders, are fully rational, the structure of the haystack model is common knowledge, and players are very patient. A complete analysis of such a setting is very complex and beyond the scope of this paper. There is reason though to conjecture that results might change significantly.
Self-interested responders now understand that their behavior in early periods may influence the behavior of proposers in later periods and may therefore be willing to reward or punish in the hope of inducing cooperation of this player in future periods, in a sense trying to build a reputation for the group they are in.
The result that rewarders serve as a catalyst for the evolution of punishers does not only highlight an important interaction between rewards and punishment. It also reinforces the point made in Dekel et al. [7] that it is important for an evolutionary analysis to consider all possible preference types. The effect that rewarders enhance the success of punishers extends beyond the context of the haystack model. The insight that rewards and punishments have a similar effect on incentives to a proposer generalizes, and so does the fact that rewards are costly once you achieve cooperation, while punishments are costly when you don't. In fact, Kuzmics and Rodriguez-Sickert [26] find a such an effect in their model considering the evolution of moral codes which can be enforced by punishments or rewards. In their model rewards are not part of any equilibrium, but they do facilitate the evolution of beneficial codes which are enforced by punishments. This interplay of rewards and punishments seems to extend even beyond the there is at such that after t periods with a probability of at least 1 − ∆ 1 the proposer assigns a belief of at least (1 − ∆2) to the composition of the group he actually happens to be in. Furthermore, for every sucht there is a T such that for all γ ∈ [δ, 1 − δ] it is optimal for a proposer of any type to experiment for at least t periods. evolutionary context. Suppose a policy maker wants to give cost efficient incentive that change a populations behavior to a better norm. Suppose people react to such incentives but this reaction is slowly due to momentum. The cost efficient way seems to start by offering rewards until a significant proportion follows the new norm. Then punishments become the cheaper way to give incentives and the policy maker changes from offering rewards for following the new norm to threatening punishment for violating it.
In summary, this non-assortative group selection model offers an explanation for the evolutionary survival of both sides of reciprocal preferences. Despite the fact that individual behavior and preferences are unobservable, individuals continue to have a marginal effect on the distribution of preferences in their group, and this influences the behavior of the other players in their group. This effect is sufficient to enable preferences for rewarding and preferences for punishing to survive in the evolutionary competition with self-interested preferences. Both preferences for rewarding and preferences for punishing can induce cooperative behavior. But there is an intrinsic difference between the two preference types: preferences for rewarding tend to coexist with self-interested preferences, whereas preferences for punishing tend either to dominate the population completely or to vanish entirely. Furthermore, rewarders enhance the evolution of preferences for punishing. Preferences for rewarding are able to invade a self-interested population and may then, as a "catalyst", enable the invasion of preferences for punishing. Punishers, on the other hand, crowd out rewarders and may even drive them out completely.
A Proofs

A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 follows from two observations. First, the distribution of types of the responders a proposer faces in his group is independent of his own type by Assumption 1. Second, responders condition their responses only on the proposer's action but not on his type or the composition of types in their group. This holds since players have preferences over outcomes only and for a responder choosing an action is equivalent to choosing an outcome of the game. In other words, the response profile which a proposer faces conditional on his own action is independent of his own type. Note also that the preference type a player has in position 1 has no influence on his fitness when he acts in role 2 since the type distribution of the other players in his group is independent of his type and since proposers have preferences over outcomes only.
Since self-interested preferences of a proposer induce fitness maximizing behavior for any given response profile, a preference type θ = (θ s , θ 2 ) with self-interested preferences when in role 1 must weakly dominate any preference type θ = (θ 1s , θ 2 ) which has the identical preferences θ 2 when in role 2 and differs only in his type when in position 1, which shows part (a). Together with the observation that under Assumption 1 for every interior state every group composition has a strictly positive probability Part (b) follows also immediately. Part (c) follows since a type (θ 1 , θ 2 ) which deviates in position 1 from fitness maximization in some groups that occur with positive probability will earn less fitness than type θ 1s , θ 2 would by replacing type (θ 1 , θ 2 ) while in all other groups type θ 1s , θ 2 earns at least the same expected fitness. Thus, type θ 1s , θ 2 earns a strictly higher expected fitness and must have a higher growth rate by payoff monotonicity, which contradicts stationarity. Part (d) we show by contradiction. Suppose there is an asymptotically stable state γ with a strictly positive proportion γ θ of a type θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 ) where proposers of type θ 1 deviate for some group composition from fitness maximizing behavior. Let θ ≡ (θ s , θ 2 ) denote the corresponding type with self-interested preferences when in the role of the proposer and identical preferences θ 2 when in the role of the responder. Consider any neighborhood of γ. It must contain a a stateγ which is an interior state withγ θ < γ θ andγ θ > γ θ .
It is well known that the solution trajectory starting from any interior state will always stay in the interior of Γ which implies by part (b) and payoff monotonicity that for any time τ > 0 holds
, which contradicts convergence to state γ.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
is strictly increasing in γ + , lim γ + →0 
Now we prove that for constant γ the right hand side is strictly increasing in N . Since the left hand side is constant, γ eq has to fall in order to equilibrate the two sides again.
The number of terms increases with N . Since all terms in equation 6 are positive it is sufficient to prove that each term increases in N . By extending N to real numbers we find
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
For 0 < γ − < 1 the difference in the average fitness between a punisher and self-interested responder can be rewrittenπ
and thus
is negative for sufficiently small γ − and positive for γ − sufficiently close to one (note that in all terms of the sum we have k − < k * − ). Thus γ − = 0 and γ − = 1 are asymptotically stable. Furthermore, the term in the large brackets is strictly increasing in γ − . Due to continuity this implies a unique interior rest point γ cut − , which is unstable and
A.5 Technical Definitions and Condition used in Proofs of Setting 3
Let
. This is the number of reciprocal players just not sufficient to induce cooperation.
. This is the number of rewarders which, for a given number of reciprocal players, is just not sufficient to induce cooperation.
. This is the number of punisher which, for a given number of reciprocal players, is just not sufficient to induce cooperation.
. For a given number k + of rewarders and a given number k ± of reciprocal players in a group k * − (k + , k ± ) corresponds to the highest number of punishers which is still not sufficient to induce cooperation in that group.
. This is the number of rewarders which, for a given number of punishers k − and reciprocal players k ± in a group, is just not sufficient to induce cooperation.
Condition 1 For i, j ∈ {+, −} with
Condition 1 ensures that for any number of reciprocal players that is not yet sufficient to induce cooperation a single rewarder (jointly with a number of punishers) can potentially be pivotal in inducing cooperation and that a single punisher (jointly with a number of rewarders)
can be pivotal in inducing cooperation. Note also that Assumption 5 is sufficient to guarantee Condition 1.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1: First we show that a monomorphic population of punishers is asymptotically stable.
It is sufficient to show that punishers earn strictly higher fitness than any other type when the proportion of non-punishers in a population state is sufficiently small. 24 First consider a type who rewards after cooperation, i.e. a rewarder or a reciprocal responder. Almost all groups cooperate and he has to bear the costs c r of rewarding with a probability arbitrarily close to one. One the other hand he can outperform a punisher only in non-cooperative groups which have a proportion arbitrarily close to zero. Hence punishers strictly outperform rewarders if the proportion of punishers is close enough to one. Now consider the expected fitness difference between a punisher and a self-interested responder. Being a punisher increases fitness by (
in groups where this has a pivotal effect, but costs c p in groups where cooperation is not achieved.
See Subsection A.5 for the definition of k * − (·, ·) and related expressions. As γ − is sufficiently close to one, γ s becomes arbitrarily small and the term in the square bracket is strictly positive for all k + . Hence punishers strictly outperform self-interested players (and all other types) in a sufficiently small neighborhood of the monomorphic punisher population.
Step 2: The claim that a monomorphic population of rewarders or a monomorphic population of self-interested players are both unstable follows directly from Proposition 1. A monomorphic population of reciprocal responders is not stable since any invading proportion of punishers will be more successful since they save the costs of rewarding but still obtain full cooperation.
Proof of Proposition 4
The following lemma is useful in proving Proposition 4. 
Proof of Lemma 5: (See Subsection A.5 for the definition of k * − (·, ·) and related expressions.)
where we split the first sum of positive terms into two equal parts and then dropped in the second part all positive terms except those for which k * + (·) = 0. For γ s sufficiently close to one γ + , γ − , and γ ± both become arbitrarily close to zero, the negative terms after c r go to zero and the total terms in the square brackets are strictly positive. Hence, there is a γ s < 1 such that for all γ with γ s < γ s < 1 holdsπ + (γ) >π s (γ). Note that γ s does not depend on the cost of punishing c p .
for all γ with γ s = γ s . Since all payoffs are continuous in γ this extends to a neighborhood and we can select an γ s such that for all γ with γ s < γ s < γ s holdsπ ± (γ) >π s (γ).
Finally, we show for any value γ s such that γ s < γ s < 1 that for sufficiently small costs of punishment c p > 0 holdsπ − (γ) >π s (γ) for all γ with 0 < γ s < γ s . For such γ at least one of the following three conditions must hold. In the second case an analogous argument applies to the following equation
In the third case the analogous argument applies tō
Jointly these three cases complete the proof of Lemma 5.
We now use it to prove Proposition 4. As a preamble note that from any interior state, and for any regular selection dynamics, the population state does not reach the boundaries in finite time, i.e. no preference-type vanishes completely in finite time. 25 First, we show that for any initial interior state γ with γ s > γ s we will after a finite time reach a state with γ s ≤ γ s , and once γ s ≤ γ s holds it will continue to hold forever. The latter follows from min{π − (γ),π + (γ),π ± (γ)} >π s (γ)for all γ with γ s < γ s < γ s . Consider any initial interior state (γ 0 + , γ 0 − , γ 0 ± , γ 0 s ). Then, as long as γ s < γ s , we must have
, which, since
For all γ ∈ A holdsπ + (γ) >π s (γ) and hence by payoff monotonicity g + (γ) > g s (γ).
Since A is compact we have that ≡ inf γ∈A {g + (γ) − g s (γ)} > 0. Hence, for all t ≥ 0 such 
We complete step 3 by showing that γ t + and γ t ± also converge to zero, and hence γ − converges to one. It suffices to show that there is an ε > 0 such that for all γ with γ s ≤ ε (again a compact set) holds π − (γ) > max{π + (γ), π ± (γ)}. We find a lower bound for π − (γ) − max{π + (γ), π ± (γ)} by distinguishing only between groups in which all N − 1 other players (excluding the one under consideration) are either rewarders or punisher and groups in which at least one player is selfinterested. In the first type of groups punishers earn c r > 0 more than rewarders, while in the other groups the fitness advantage of rewarders is bounded (e.g. by (c 2 − d 2 + c p ) ). When γ s goes to 0, the total probability mass on the first type of groups goes to one and the total probability mass on the second type of groups goes to zero. Hence, π − (γ) > max{π + (γ), π ± (γ)} for sufficiently small γ − which completes step 3.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Step 1: Fix a setting. Let π i,∆ (γ) denotes the expected average fitness of type i in state γ ∈ Γ in the ∆-bounded perturbation of the model. Then, for every > 0 there exists a ∆ > 0 such that for all γ ∈ Γ and all θ, θ ∈ {+, −, s} holds
To LetP t θ,k (γ) denote the probability that a player of type θ is in a group that has the constant composition k in all T subperiods and in subperiod t the action profile played in this group is
Step 2: Setting 1: Let 0 < δ < 1 4 min{γ eq , (1 − γ eq )}. Consider any δ ∈ (0, δ). 
Step 2: From setting 1 and setting 2 it follows immediately that for θ ∈ {+, s} the sets {γ : γ θ ≥ 1 − δ} are not δ-stable.
Step 3: Let c p sufficiently small such that Lemma 5 in the proof of Proposition 4 applies.
Then we can find 0 < γ s < γ s < 1 such thatπ + (γ) >π s (γ) whenever 1 > γ s ≥ γ s , and π − (γ) >π s (γ) whenever 0 < γ s ≤ γ s . Furthermore we know from the last paragraph of step 3 of the proof of Proposition 4 that there is anγ s > 0 such that for all γ with γ s <γ s holds
Step 1 guaranties that we can choose a ∆ > 0 such that the payoff structure that we need for step 3 of the proof of Proposition 4 is preserved for ∆-bounded perturbations and the argument there still applies.
A.8 Proof of Lemma 2
|P θ,k (γ) = B θ,k (γ)| < ∆ holds automatically since the composition of types in a group is not changed in this robustness check and therefore P θ,k (γ) = B θ,k (γ). Furthermore, we assumed the generic case where parameters in each of the settings without mistakes are such that the expected payoff for player 1 after one action is always strictly different from the other actions. Let g denote the minimum of the absolute value of this payoff difference for all group compositions.
Payoffs are bounded. Let b denote the maximal payoff difference. If the mistake probabilities of responders are bounded by , then, for a given action, the change in expected payoff for proposers is bounded by b and if we choose < g 2b the proposers' optimal choice of action is not influenced by these small enough mistake probabilities. Then we can find for any ∆ > 0 a sufficiently small with 0 < < g 2b such that W ((a 1 , . . . , a T ) = (e 1 , . . . , e T )) < ∆. 27 Hence, W (E ∆ (a) ≥ W (a = e) > 1 − ∆, and thus W is a ∆-perturbation of a.
A.9 Proof of Lemma 3
|P θ,k (γ) = B θ,k (γ)| < ∆ holds automatically since the composition of types in a group is not changed in this robustness check, thus P θ,k (γ) = B θ,k (γ).
At a time t we call the action that scored the highest average subjective utility up to that time the "intended" action of a player. The other action with a lower score is called the "unintended ,∆ 8(r+p) }.
Step 1: Aftert ,∆ periods in a group the intended action of all responders corresponds with probability of at least 1 − ∆ 8 to their respective preference type and will not change afterwards. To see this consider a responder. Once he has tried all actions available at a certain node his valuation of each action will not change further. At each node he will afterwards choose the action which gives him the highest subjective utility with probability (1 − )), i.e. a rewarder will reward after cooperation, a punisher will punish after defection and a self-interested type will neither reward nor punish. Note that after three periods all (of the maximally two) decision 
+ 3 For all times
t >t δ the probability that for any given player all final nodes have been reached (and therefore every action has been tried by player 2 and his intended action will now always correspond to his preference type) is greater than 1
. Hence, the probability that all players in position 2 in a given group play according to their respective preference type after timet δ is greater than 1 − δ 8 .
Step 2: There exists a timet ,∆ such that for all T >t ,∆ +t ,∆ with probability greater than 1 − ∆ 8 the proportion of periods in which, for a given group, the intended action of any proposer in that group deviates from the one derived in Section 2 28 is below ∆ 8 . Conditional on being in a situation in which the intended action of player 2 corresponds to 27 The proof, e.g. by induction, is straightforward. 28 I.e. cooperation for c 1 
his preference type the expected payoff of cooperation and of defection for player 1 is respectively
Since <∆ that a t = a t . By the law of large numbers we can find a sufficiently large T 2 > T 1 such that for all T > T 2 with probability greater than 1 − ∆ 4 from these periods a proportion greater or equal (1 − ∆ 4 ) has a realization a t = a t . Together, we have with probability greater than 1 − ∆ 2 that for a proportion greater than 1 − ∆ 2 holds a t = a t . This establishes that the distribution generated by this -reinforcement learning is a ∆ bounded perturbation of the action profile a derived under Assumption 2.
A.10 Proof of Lemma 4
We only have to show that for sufficiently small w > 0 holds that for all γ ∈ Γ P t θ,k (γ) − B θ,k (γ) < ∆,
since conditionally on on type θ being in a group that has composition k in all T periods the property that W t k (a t k = a * k ) ≥ (1 − ∆) for all t > T ∆ follows immediately from the previous analysis (in case (a) we have a t k = a * k in all periods anyway, in case (b) the proof of Lemma 2 needs only to be conditioned on type θ being in a group that has composition k in all T periods, and in case (c) the same is true for the proof of Lemma 3).
Let f t θ,w (γ) denote the fraction of of type θ players in subperiod t which are born after the last reshuffling of groups. Then, with P T k (w) denoting the probability that a given group of composition k has never a change in its composition in all T periods, for sufficiently small w holds B θ,k (γ) ≥ P 
Definitions from Evolutionary Game Theory
The following presentation adapts definitions from Weibull [42] , Chapert 6 to our setting. Definition 4 relates the evolutionary success of each type to the obtained fitness payoffs. Types that earn greater average fitness have higher growth-rates.
Definition 4 A regular growth-rate function g is called payoff monotonic if
Payoff monotonicity captures the process of evolutionary selection. Whether a limit point of this dynamic process is robust to mutations depends on the stability of this state. Intuitively, Lyapunov stability guaranties that sufficiently small mutations do not lead far away from the considered population state. Asymptotic stability requires in addition that after small mutations the population is driven back to the stable state by the selection dynamics. These stability concepts can be generalized to sets. Figure 6 illustrates the evolutionary dynamics in Setting 2. preferences and nobody punishes defection. If, on the other hand, the initial fraction of punishing players is above the cutoff γ cut , then this fraction increases until the entire population has preferences for punishing. One might therefore interpret the value of γ cut as an indicator for how likely it is to end up in one or the other equilibrium. 30 The comparative statics of γ cut is analogous to setting 1 and can be derived directly from equation ??.
B.2.2 Setting 2
Higher costs of punishing diminish the basin of attraction of the punisher equilibrium: The intuition is straightforward: the higher the number of punishing players, the cheaper it is to be a punisher. If the costs of punishing increase, punishers become less fit. Hence punishing players need a higher fraction of punishers in order to be at least as successful as non-punishers. Higher gains from cooperation for player 2 are good for punishers. Hence the basin of attraction for their equilibrium becomes larger: Again, the intuition is straightforward: the higher the gains of cooperation for a player 2, the higher his profit from being pivotal in inducing cooperation of players 1. Therefore a lower fraction of punishers is necessary in order to make punishing more successful than non-punishing.
Lemma 6
If the threshold k * − of punishing players 2 in a group above which the players 1 start to cooperate increases then γ cut increases, i.e. there are more punishing players necessary in order to end up in the punishing equilibrium.
Intuitively, a higher threshold k * − makes it more probable for an individual to be in a group in which the number of punishers is too low to induce cooperation. In these groups being a punisher is costly. Therefore, fitness of punishers is lower and a higher initial fraction of punishers is necessary to make punishing more successful than non-punishing.
